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ABSTRACT
This Article investigates the legal and economic environment for
private equity investments in Brazil, Russia, India and China
(“BRIC”). In contrast with disappointing returns in the 1990s,
private equity investment has soared in developing countries over
the past decade. To explain what has led to the recent success of
private equity in the BRICs, this Article will first give an overview
of the challenges faced generally when investing in portfolio
companies in developing markets and then analyze the legal and
economic framework for each of the four BRICs. This Article finds
that Brazil and China offer the best opportunities for private equity
because investors can rely on strong domestic capital markets for the
exit. While India is not far behind, Russia still has room for
improvement, particularly with regard to the reliability of its legal
system and the attractiveness of its capital markets.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 30, 2001, Jim O’Neill, then Goldman Sachs’
Head of Global Economic Research, coined the term “BRICs,” referring
to the growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.1 He
predicted that, “over the next 10 years, the weight of the BRICs and
especially China in world GDP will grow”2 and that “by 2011 China
1. JIM O’NEILL, GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL ECON. PAPER NO: 66, BUILDING
BETTER GLOBAL ECONOMIC BRICS (2001), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com
/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/build-better-brics.pdf; see Beth Kowitt,
For Mr. Bric, Nations Meeting a Milestone, CNN MONEY (June 17, 2009, 2:52 PM),
http://money.cnn.com/2009/06/17/news/economy/goldman_sachs_jim_oneill_interview
.fortune/index.htm.
2. O’NEILL, supra note 1, at 1.
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will actually be as big as Germany on a current GDP basis, and Brazil
and India not far behind Italy.”3 Another Goldman Sachs Economics
paper later forecasted that “[t]he BRICs economies taken together could
be larger than the G6 by 2039.”4 In 2007, China already surpassed
Germany in current gross domestic product (“GDP”), outrunning Jim
O’Neill’s prediction by four years.5 By 2011, Brazil was the sixth largest
economy, Russia ninth, and India tenth.6 The BRIC phenomenon has
now taken a political dimension as well. In May 2008, Russia hosted the
first BRIC summit, followed by Brazil in 2010.7
As competition for attractive targets within the United States
increases steadily, American private equity firms gradually look for
more investments in the global markets.8 Europe would be a potential
market as it provides the appropriate legal infrastructure, but it cannot
compete with the high growth rates of the emerging markets.9
Additionally, low company valuations in markets with capital shortages
provide more opportunity for high returns.10 Therefore, capital in the
private equity industry is increasingly flowing from developed countries
into developing markets. Over the past decade, fundraising for emerging
markets private equity funds has grown exponentially from $3.2 billion
in 2002 to a record high of $66.5 billion in 2008.11 During the same
period, investments in emerging markets rose from $2 billion to $47.8

3.
4.

Id. at 6.
DOMINIC WILSON & ROOPA PURUSHOTHAMAN, GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL
ECON. PAPER NO: 99, DREAMING WITH BRICS: THE PATH TO 2050, at 3 (2003),
available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf.
5. See Indicators, GDP (current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
6. Id.
7. Gillian Tett, The Man Who Named the Future, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 16,
2010, at 30.
8. See HEINO MEERKATT & HEINRICH LIECHTENSTEIN, ET AL., NEW MARKETS,
NEW RULES: WILL EMERGING MARKETS RESHAPE PRIVATE EQUITY? 3 (2010), available
at http://www.bcg.com/documents/file64907.pdf.
9. See Gonzalo Pacanins, Private Equity in Developing Countries (1997)
(unpublished MBA essay, Harvard Business School), available at http://www.people.h
bs.edu/jlerner/develop.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2012).
10. See Roger Leeds & Julie Sunderland, Private Equity Investing in Emerging
Markets, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 111, 112 (2003).
11. EMERGING MKTS. PRIVATE EQUITY ASS’N, FULL-YEAR 2011 INDUSTRY
STATISTICS (2012) [hereinafter EMPEA], available at http://www.empea.org/research/d
ata-and-statistics/full-year-2011-em-pe-industry-statistics/.
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billion, with a record high of $53.1 billion in 2007.12 A record amount of
$92.5 billion flowed into emerging market funds in 2010.13
In many regards, these emerging countries have even benefited
from the recent financial crisis. The BRICs’ contribution to global
growth has risen to forty-five percent since the beginning of the
financial crisis in 2007, up from twenty-four percent in the years 2000–
2006.14 The stagnant U.S. economy contributed to the trend towards
international diversification.15 The economic downturn in the U.S. has
reduced the number of available private equity deals, thus requiring
firms to look for targets globally in order to compete successfully and
deliver expected returns.16
Private equity in emerging markets not only benefits investors from
developed countries; it can also have substantial benefits for a
developing market economy and the businesses operating therein. Often,
private equity bridges the gap in corporate financing needed for growth,
offering a mature business an alternative between costly debt financing
and an Initial Public Offering (“IPO”).17 Additionally, a private equity
firm will often provide experienced management teams18, and in the
event of an investment exit through an IPO on an international
exchange, the private equity backing allows the target initial access to

12.
13.

Id.
Alison Tudor, Baring Raises $2.46 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 1, 2011, 10:17
AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870344590457611754310047953
6.html.
14. See JIM O’NEILL & ANNA STUPNYTSKA, GOLDMAN SACHS, GLOBAL ECON.
PAPER NO: 192, THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK FOR THE BRICS AND N-11 POST CRISIS 6
(2009), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-repo
rts-pdfs/long-term-outlook.pdf.
15. See Chris Snow, The Credit Crisis of 2008: Impact of Credit Crisis on Private
Equity Markets, 28 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 71, 74 (2008).
16. See Thomas W. France, Seeing Beyond the Cycle: Understanding the Longand Short-Term Effects of the Economic Downturn, in PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE
CAPITAL TRENDS IN A TURBULENT ECONOMY: LEADING LAWYERS ON DEVELOPING
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES, EVALUATING NEW GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES, AND ANALYZING
SHORT- AND LONG-TERM MARKET CHANGES *3 (2009).
17. See DAVID P. STOWELL, AN INTRODUCTION TO INVESTMENT BANKS, HEDGE
FUNDS, AND PRIVATE EQUITY 342 (2010).
18. See id. at 325.
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international capital markets.19 The increase in liquidity in the domestic
capital markets of a developing country through foreign investment also
reduces the cost of raising capital domestically.20 It encourages other
domestic and foreign issuers to come to the capital markets, thereby
creating further liquidity.21
Expectations were not realized, however, during the first surge of
emerging markets private equity in the mid-1990s. Returns were often
even lower than those of comparable funds in the United States and
Europe, despite the significantly higher risks involved.22 As a result,
emerging markets private equity funds had difficulty raising funds at the
turn of the century.23 Leeds and Sunderland name three principal reasons
for the initial underperformance. First, targets in emerging markets often
suffered under low corporate governance standards, including a low
level of accountability resulting in high agency costs.24 Second, many
private equity funds found legal recourse limited as key contractual
protections were unenforceable in the jurisdictions where they made
their investments.25 Third, domestic capital markets could not offer the
necessary liquidity to allow for high return IPO exits, and international
capital markets proved to be a realistic option only for the largest
companies of developing countries.26
This Article will analyze the current legal and political environment
faced by private equity funds investing in the BRICs. In what ways have
the BRICs embraced the potential benefits offered by foreign private
equity investment and created a more investment-friendly framework
that can explain the exponential growth in emerging markets private
equity over the past decade? To answer this question, this Article will
first briefly outline the private equity life cycle and describe the
difficulties faced in each stage when applied to an emerging market
environment, from the investment until the exit (Section II). Then, this
19. See, e.g., KPMG, HOW YOU CAN ACCESS THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET
(2007), available at http://www.kpmg.com.cn/en/virtual_library/Private_equity/How_y
ou_can_access_PE_market.pdf.
20. Christopher J. Mailander, Searching for Liquidity: United States Exit Strategies
for International Private Equity Investment, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 71, 79 (1997).
21. Id.
22. Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 111.
23. Id. at 114.
24. Id. at 114–15.
25. Id. at 115.
26. Id. at 115–16.
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Article will analyze the legal and economic conditions relevant to
private equity in each of the four BRICs (Section III). In this context,
the objective is not to provide an exhaustive treatise of all relevant
aspects corporate counsel has to consider when advising a private equity
firm investing in the BRICs, but rather to lay the foundation for a
comparison of the investment climate for private equity in the four
countries, which will provide insight regarding the key drivers for
private equity growth (Section IV).
I. THE PRIVATE EQUITY LIFE CYCLE AND DIFFICULTIES WHEN
INVESTING IN EMERGING MARKETS
A private equity investment—the private placement of money in a
business venture27—can take very different forms, such as a leveraged
buyout (“LBO”), growth capital, mezzanine lending, and venture
capital.28 LBOs are less common in emerging markets private equity
investments compared to the U.S. private equity market, due to less
available leverage29 and foreign direct investment (“FDI”) restrictions
limiting foreign investors to certain percentages of the target’s
outstanding shares.30 Emerging markets also pose certain challenges to
the potential for traditional venture capital investments. Among such
challenges can be the lack of trained local talent and infrastructure and
weak protection of intellectual property.31 The inherent risk of venture
capital may be increased by the market circumstances to a degree that
renders the investment inadvisable. Thus, growth capital investments are
most common and, interestingly, also produce higher returns in
emerging markets.32

27. See, e.g., José Raúl Alcántar & David W. McCombie III, Hispanic Private
Equity: A Cultural Approach to Achieving Superior Investment Returns, 10 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 233, 235 (2007).
28. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 283; see also Steven D. Bortnick & John I. Forry,
Structuring International Private Equity Investments in the People’s Republic of China,
126 BANKING L.J. 195, 196 (2009).
29. Greg Bright, BRICs offer old-fashioned private equity growth, INVESTMENT &
TECHNOLOGY, Mar. 1, 2011, http://www.investmentmagazine.com.au/i-t-news/bricsoffer-old-fashioned-private-equity-growth.
30. See infra Part II for foreign direct investment (“FDI”) in the respective BRICs.
31. Pacanins, supra note 9.
32. See MEERKATT & LIECHTENSTEIN, supra note 8, at 3.
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Independent from the underlying private equity strategy, the private
equity lifecycle typically begins with raising funds from end-investors,
then moves on to identifying and buying into appropriate target
companies, and ends with an exit that liquidates the investment and
enables the private equity firm to distribute the returns to the endinvestors.33 In a domestic private equity investment, the most important
decision is the choice of an appropriate target company. The private
equity investor will make this decision based on the information it
receives from possible target companies and its experience in evaluating
such information.34 However, when investing in an emerging market,
this decision can follow only after a determination of a proper market to
invest in. Subsequently, the deal must be structured according to both
the legal and economic frameworks of the market and the target
company’s individual situation. Right from the beginning, possible exit
strategies must be taken into account because they influence the
structuring of the investment. This is particularly true when investing in
emerging markets, where the lack of a viable exit strategy is often a
major concern.35
This Section will investigate the particular difficulties that a private
equity investment faces in each of the stages of the private equity life
cycle. Part A will describe how the legal and economic frameworks of a
particular country affect the investment decision, as well as the factors
to be considered when choosing an appropriate target. Part B will
discuss the deal structure and the instruments employed by a private
equity investor to ensure its returns. Finally, Part C will illustrate the
different means of exiting a private equity investment in an emerging
market.
A. DUE DILIGENCE: CHOOSING MARKET AND TARGET
At the outset, a private equity investor has to decide which
particular market it wishes to invest in. Numerous factors pose a
particular challenge to private equity investment in emerging markets,
and these factors can vary substantially depending on the individual
33. See Mailander, supra note 20, at 75–77; see also Wei Shen, China’s Dilemma:
How Can a Weak Company Law Regime Support a Strong Market for International
Private Equity Investments? A Real ‘Piggybacking’ Case, 11 BUS. L. INT’L. 195, 196–
97 (2010).
34. Mailander, supra note 20, at 76.
35. See id at 78.
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market. Risks to be considered include currency fluctuation, political
instability, liquidity, accounting, tax, and volatility of capital markets.36
Thus, private equity funds typically focus on a particular market in order
to ensure that managers have the required expertise, as well as to offer
investors the required risk profile.
1. Choosing the Market
There are several aspects that are particularly important when
choosing an appropriate market. The first of these is the quality of the
legal system and its suitability for foreign private equity investment.37 A
government might restrict access to foreign investment in certain key
industries or the investment might be subject to government approval,
the denial of which at a progressed stage of the investment may create
significant costs. Moreover, the investor must consider how reliable the
judicial system is in enforcing its rights in the event of a dispute. In this
context, corruption or bias towards foreign investors may still be a
potential risk.38 The second concern is the liquidity and functionality of
the local capital markets. The objective of a private equity investment—
to obtain a higher return after a relatively long commitment of capital—
relies on the availability of a profitable exit. When lack of liquidity or
the underdeveloped regulations of capital markets in the domestic
market bar access to an IPO in the domestic market, the investor must
resort to alternative exit strategies that may require more preparation and
offer substantially less certain returns.39
Part III of this Article will scrutinize these legal and economic
factors in the BRIC countries to determine their suitability for foreign
private equity investment.
2. Choosing the Target
Once the appropriate market has been determined, the investor
must identify an appropriate target company. Unlike in the U.S. private
equity market, where investors often receive offers for potential targets,
36.
37.
38.
39.

See STOWELL, supra note 17, at 143.
See Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 115.
See Pacanins, supra note 9.
See Mailander, supra note 20, at 108; Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at
115. Alternative exit strategies will be discussed in Part C of this section.
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the investor must assume a more proactive role in identifying and
selecting suitable targets.40 In doing so, an investor should establish a
local base of operations in order to generate the necessary market
intelligence and learn of new investment opportunities, which are often
communicated through well-connected business and social circles.41 An
“ideal” target company should have highly qualified and motivated
management because the high leverage employed in a buyout does not
leave much room for error in the future operation of the company.42
Where a private equity firm provides growth capital, problems can arise
particularly in family-run companies when management resists the
influence of the financial investor.43 Moreover, a target company should
have a substantial and stable cash flow to service the new debt, low
leverage at the outside, as well as suitable assets that can be used as
collateral for the debt to be incurred.44 Determining whether a potential
target satisfies these requirements can be difficult in practice. Where
sound financial and operating information is not available, it becomes
almost impossible to evaluate a target company accurately during the
due diligence process.45 Even if financial statements are available, it can
be difficult to assess their accuracy when they are not independently
audited or based on accepted financial accounting standards.46
B. MAKING THE INVESTMENT
When a suitable target has been identified, the private equity
investor moves on to negotiate and consummate the deal. The structure
of the deal depends largely on the investment strategy. In a LBO, the
private equity firm will take control of the target company by the
purchase of all or most of the company’s equity.47 Thus, the LBO

40.
41.

Pacanins, supra note 9; Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 117.
Pacanins, supra note 9; see Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 116 (naming
the reluctance of private equity funds to establish local operations as a major reason for
the disappointing performance of private equity in emerging markets in the 1990s).
42. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 285.
43. Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 114; see also Érica Gorga, Culture and
Corporate Law Reform: A Case Study of Brazil, 27 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 803, 813
(2006).
44. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 285.
45. Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 114.
46. Id.
47. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 284.
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investor will be less concerned with ensuring additional control rights
than a minority investor.48 The focus in a buyout lies on ensuring that
the target can meet its debt obligations, and on aligning management
incentives with those of the investor.49 In a growth capital scenario,
however, the private equity firm will take only a minority position in
order to provide capital to the target company without a change of
control.50 A minority position translates to a higher risk and the private
equity investor will seek to ensure its return through the use of
convertible equity or debt.51 Depending on the market, these instruments
may not be available, or at least not to the same extent, in developing
countries.52 Moreover, the investor will seek to gain influence over the
target company’s management through control rights.53 Such control
rights usually include, among others, anti-dilution clauses, tag-along
clauses and supermajority provisions.54 Therefore, the enforceability of
such control rights in the event of a dispute is of extreme importance for
a growth capital investor.55 When private equity firms are faced with
less efficient legal enforcement, they usually prefer majority ownership
and more board representation over contractual rights.56 However, where
majority ownership is prevented by restrictions on foreign investment or
the lack of available financing, the reliability of the local judicial system
becomes again a major concern.57
48. Buyouts: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, http://us.practicallaw.com/4381-1368?q=buyouts%20overview.
49. Id.
50. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 283.
51. Minority Investments: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, http://us.practial
law.com/ 1-422-1158?q=minority%20investments%20overview [hereinafter Minority
Investments: Overview]
52. See infra Part II, for the availability of financial instruments in each of the
BRICs.
53. Minority Investments: Overview, supra note 51.
54. See Cinthia Daniela Bertan Ribeiro, Financial Contracting Choices in Brazil:
Does the Brazilian Legal Environment Allow Private Equity Groups to Enter Into
Complex Contractual Arrangements With Brazilian Companies?, 13 L. & BUS. REV.
AM. 355, 368-69 (2007), for a description of these control rights.
55. See STOWELL, supra note 17, at 361.
56. Ribeiro, supra note 54, at 370 (citing Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does
Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private
Equity, 120 Q. J. ECON. 223, 224-25 (2005)).
57. See supra Part I.A.1.
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Another major determinant in the structure of a private equity
transaction is tax efficiency. Private equity firms will often incorporate
holding companies in one or more offshore jurisdictions in order to take
advantage of tax havens and beneficial tax treaties.58 Such tax
considerations are complex and independent from the general legal,
economic and political environment of private equity investments and
are thus beyond the scope of this Article.
C. EXITING THE INVESTMENT
The exit enables the private equity fund to liquidate its investment
and distribute the returns to its investors. Consequently, the exit
determines the return for the investors and is therefore quintessential for
a successful private equity investment.59
The most profitable way of exiting a private equity investment is
usually by way of an IPO on a domestic exchange.60 Thus, private equity
investment is most attractive where liquid and developed capital markets
enable the investor to take the target company public. A major concern
about emerging markets traditionally has been that capital markets are
either not sufficiently liquid or lack the required regulatory
infrastructure.61 However, the BRICs, especially Brazil and China, have
taken significant steps to increase the liquidity and attractiveness of their
domestic capital markets.62
When a domestic IPO does not promise to achieve the required
result, the listing of shares on an exchange in a developed market offers
an important alternative. Traditionally, the U.S. has been the primary
market for foreign listings due to its high liquidity and receptiveness for
foreign companies.63 Even though the majority of global IPOs are now
conducted outside the U.S., listings in the U.S. still amounted to 31% of

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See, e.g., Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at 198-99.
See id. at 197-98.
Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 115.
Id.; Pacanins, supra note 9.
See infra Part II, for an analysis of the BRIC capital markets.
Mailander, supra note 20, at 80. But see Christopher J. Mailander, Tempering a
Chill on Skittish Capital Markets: Illiquid Investments in the Wake of Global Volatility,
13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 379, 384-85 (1997) (pointing out that U.S. investors have
proven to be more receptive to offerings by foreign issuers from developed countries
rather than those from emerging markets).
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all IPOs launched in 2008.64 In order to free potential investors from
possible currency risk and limitations on the investment in foreign
securities, offerings of foreign companies in the U.S. are usually
executed through the issue of American Depository Receipts
(“ADRs”).65 Shares of the foreign issuer are deposited with a U.S. bank,
which issues dollar-denominated ADRs that represent the underlying
shares.66 The U.S. depository bank is also responsible for collecting
share dividends from the issuer and distributing them to the holders of
ADRs, converted into U.S. dollars.67 An ADR issue does not necessarily
need to be listed on an exchange and registered with the SEC. A listing
on an over-the-counter market or a private placement exempt from the
registration requirements is also possible and can significantly reduce
the costs and potential liabilities associated with registration under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.68 These options may be
particularly attractive for companies from emerging markets.69 Despite
its lower liquidity, this market now appears to be the predominant means
for foreign companies to raise capital in the U.S.70 The difficulties faced
when offering in the U.S. market will, however, require the private
equity firm to play an active role and assist the portfolio company in the
preparation and execution of the exit.71 Also, a listing on an exchange in
a developed market may only be realistic for large companies in the
emerging market with sufficient visibility to attract foreign investors.72
If a public offering does not appear feasible either domestically or
abroad, the private equity firm can exit the investment through a private
sale. Such a sale can be to a strategic buyer or to a later stage financial
investor. Companies in emerging markets that received foreign private
64.
65.

STOWELL, supra note 17, at 146-47.
Mailander, supra note 20, at 83. See S. Eric Wang, Investing Abroad:
Regulation S and U.S. Retail Investment in Foreign Securities, 10 U. MIAMI BUS. L.
REV. 329 (2002), for a discussion of Regulation S restricting U.S. investment in foreign
securities.
66. Mailander, supra note 20, at 83; STOWELL, supra note 17, at 151.
67. Mailander, supra note 20, at 84.
68. Id. at 99.
69. Id. at 105-07.
70. HAL S. SCOTT, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY, AND
REGULATION 52 (Foundation Press 17th ed. 2010).
71. Mailander, supra note 20, at 108.
72. Robert D. Stillman, Alternative Exit Strategies for International Private Equity,
13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 133, 134 (1997).
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equity investment can present attractive opportunities for strategic
buyers from developed countries because the private equity investor
often will have introduced internationally accepted accounting standards
and more efficient management structures.73 Thus, when a private equity
firm invests significant resources to add value by making operations and
management more efficient, sales to strategic buyers have the potential
to achieve similar returns as public offerings.74 Otherwise, however,
private sales tend not to achieve the same returns as public offerings.75
In addition, it may be difficult to limit the seller’s liabilities in regard to
the portfolio company. Because of the private equity firm’s objective to
exit the investment entirely, such limitations on liability may have to be
bought by way of a lower purchase price. Thus, it is important for the
private equity firm to consider the likelihood of a private sale at the
outset when making the investment. Potentially, the lack of a viable exit
strategy renders an otherwise attractive investment opportunity
infeasible.
II. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR
PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE BRICS
The previous section carved out the challenges generally faced by a
private equity firm when investing in an emerging market. This section
will look in more detail at the legal and economic environment for
private equity in the four leading emerging markets: Brazil, Russia,
India and China.76 It is important to note, however, that these four
countries cannot be understood as being representative of the larger
geographical market they are located in. Especially in Asia, regulatory

73. Id. at 134-35; see STOWELL, supra note 17, at 325 (concluding that private
equity-owned companies tend to be better managed).
74. See infra Part II.B.3.a.
75. Mailander, supra note 20, at 386.
76. In 2005, Goldman Sachs recognized another group of emerging economies, the
Next Eleven (N-11), consisting of Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Mexico, Nigeria,
Pakistan, Philippines, South Korea, Turkey and Vietnam. See Jim O’Neill et al., How
Solid are the BRICs (Goldman Sachs Global Econ. Working Paper No. 134, 2005),
available at http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/brics/brics-reports-pdfs/howsolid.pdf. However, in terms of current GDP, the BRICs are still the largest emerging
economies. See World Bank, Indicators, GDP (current US$), http://data.worldbank.org
/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Mar. 24, 2011).
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regimes differ significantly between China and other Asian markets,
such as Japan or Southeast Asia.
In order to make the observations somewhat comparable, certain
legal and economic aspects relevant to private equity will be
investigated for each of the four countries. These include the treatment
of FDI as the entry barrier for foreign investors, the law applicable to
takeovers of public targets (public to private transactions), corporate law
and the enforcement of contractual rights, and finally, potential exit
strategies—in particular the strength of the domestic IPO market.
A. BRAZIL
In 2010, Brazil’s GDP increased by 7.5% compared to the previous
year, representing the highest level of growth since 1986.77 In 2009, the
GDP had reached about $1.5 trillion, making Brazil the eighth largest
economy in the world.78 Growth slowed to 2.7% in 2011,79 indicating
that Brazil did not remain unaffected by a sluggish economy worldwide.
However, this did not affect the growth of FDI, which amounted to
$66.7 billion in 2011, up from $48.5 billion in 2010.80 Brazil was
forecasted to attract $45 billion in foreign direct investment in 2010,
which would mean a 74% increase from 2009.81 Even during the
financial crisis, the private equity industry in Brazil has performed
comparably well. After a record year in 2007 with investments of $5.3
billion, investments dropped to $3 billion in 2008 and $1 billion in 2009,
returning to the 2006 level, but rebounding strongly in 2010 to $4.6

77. Brazil’s GDP Rises 7.5% in 2010, Achieving Best Result in 25 Years, PR
NEWSWIRE, Mar. 3, 2011, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/brazils-gdp-rises75-in-2010-achieving-best-result-in-25-years-117329823.html.
78. WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
79. WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
80. Brazil record foreign direct investment more than compensates current account
deficit, MERCO PRESS (Jan. 25, 2012, 03:58 UTC), http://en.mercopress.com/2012/01/2
5/brazil-record-foreign-direct-investment-more-than-compensates-current-account-defi
cit; see also Kenneth Rapoza, Slower Brazil Economy Doesn’t Stop US Deal Flow,
FORBES (Aug. 25, 2011, 4:27 AM) htp://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/201
1/08/25/slower-brazil-economy-doesn’t-stop-us-deal-flow/.
81. Brazil Economy Forecasted to Grow More than 5% in 2010, PR NEWSWIRE,
Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/brazil-economy-forecastedto-grow-more-than-5-in-2010-82184502.html.
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billion.82 In large part, this seems due to the fact that Brazilian private
equity investments rely to a much lesser extent on leverage.83 Deals with
less than 50% equity are rare, and many deals are even made with 100%
equity.84
Taking in private equity capital in the form of growth capital (25%
to 30%) prior to an IPO is a common strategy for family-run Brazilian
businesses.85 A favorable legal regulatory environment combined with a
large number of companies suitable for private equity investment
contributes to a favorable climate for the private equity industry.86 In
response to the growing opportunities in Brazil, several foreign private
equity firms, such as Carlyle and Actis, have opened offices in Brazil
over the past few years.87
1. Foreign Direct Investment
A preliminary concern for every private equity firm investing
abroad, but especially for those looking for potential buyout targets, is a
country’s regulation of FDI. FDI regulation generally either bars FDI
entirely in certain strategic sectors or limits it to a specific percentage of
a company’s outstanding stock.88
In Brazil, three government authorities are responsible for the
regulation of FDI. The National Monetary Council (“CMN”) establishes
the general rules concerning the registration of foreign investments.89
The Central Bank of Brazil (“BACEN”), among other tasks, controls the
foreign exchange markets and executes the rules established by CMN.90
The Brazilian Security and Exchange Commission (“CVM”) is

82.
83.

EMPEA, supra note 11.
Steve Rubens, The Future of Brazilian Markets: A Private Equity Perspective,
SEEKING ALPHA, July 6, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/147086-the-future-ofbrazilian-markets-a-private-equity-perspective.
84. Latin Flourish, FIN. TIMES MANDATE, May 2009, http://www.ftmandate.com/
news/printpage.php/aid/2060/Latin_flourish.html.
85. STOWELL, supra note 17, at 148.
86. Rubens, supra note 83.
87. Latin Flourish, supra note 84 (noting that most foreign private equity
investment comes from the U.S. and Europe).
88. See infra Parts II.B.1. (Russia), II.C.1. (India) and II.D.1 (China), for FDI
regulation in the other BRIC countries.
89. DEMAREST E ALMEIDA, BUSINESS LAWS OF BRAZIL § 3:1 (Sept. 2009).
90. Id.
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responsible for foreign investor activities on the Brazilian capital
markets.91
Investments in non-regulated sectors can be made without any prior
authorization or license and are generally treated the same way as
domestic investments.92 Invested capital can be remitted freely once it
has been registered with BACEN.93 BACEN does not have the authority
to determine whether a certain investment is “desirable” or deny
registration because of an adverse effect on the Brazilian economy.94
Foreign investment in Brazilian companies is entirely prohibited
only as it concerns the following activities: (1) exploring, exploiting,
and selling radioactive minerals and its by-products; (2) health services;
(3) business located on international borders; and (4) post office
services.95 Foreign investment is limited to 30% ownership of an entity
operating newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals, as well as radio
and television broadcasters,96 and 20% ownership in airlines with
concessions for domestic flight routes.97
2. Takeovers of Public Targets
Takeover law is relevant for a private equity investor who plans to
buy out a public company and take it private. In this case, a private
equity investor has to make a mandatory public offering (“OPA”) for
acquisition or exchange of securities under Brazilian law.98 The OPA
must (1) be launched by the company’s controlling shareholder or the
company itself; (2) be aimed at the acquisition of all outstanding shares;
and (3) achieve the tender by at least two-thirds of the free float.99 The
statute mandates a floor for the share price offered in the OPA, which
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id. § 3:2.
Id. § 3:2-3:3.
Id. § 3:3. The only exception to this rule is an investment in a financial
institution.
95. Id. § 3:8 (citing CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 21, item X,
XXIII, art. 199, para. 3 (Braz.); Law No. 9263, art. 7).
96. Id. § 3:9 (citing CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 222, para.
1 (Braz.)).
97. Id. § 3:11 (citing Lei No. 7,565 art. 181, Item II, de 19 de Novembro de 1986
(Braz.)).
98. Id. § 2:17 (citing CVM Regulation 361).
99. Id. § 2:18.
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includes a certain premium over the share price.100 Should the acquirer
obtain 95% or more of the outstanding shares through the OPA, the
remaining shareholders can be squeezed out for the same price.101
A mandatory OPA is triggered when an entity acquires a
controlling interest in a public corporation.102 The CVM determines
whether a controlling interest was acquired on a case-by-case basis and
not solely on the percentage of stock acquired. In particular, a purchase
of stock may be held to be an acquisition of a controlling interest when
the acquirer, through a shareholders’ agreement, prevails at
shareholders’ meetings and is able to elect a majority of the board.103
Thus, even a private equity firm investing in growth capital may run the
risk of being subjected to a mandatory OPA and should therefore
carefully structure its investment so as not to be held to have acquired a
controlling interest in the target company.
An investor who resides, is domiciled or has its head offices outside
Brazil needs to appoint both a representative and a custodian in
Brazil.104 The custodian for the foreign investor’s investment in Brazil
must be authorized by BACEN and CVM.105
3. Corporate Law and Enforcement of Contractual Rights
The main legal entities used in Brazil are the limited liability
company (sociedade limitada) and the corporation (sociedade
anônima).106 Structuring the investment as a limited liability company
offers simplicity and flexibility in the corporate structure, lower
maintenance costs and fewer legal formalities compared to a
corporation.107 However, only a corporation can issue securities or

100. Daniella Tavares, Using Brazil’s Regulatory System as a Thoughtful
Experience, in BANKING AND FINANCE CLIENT STRATEGIES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH
AMERICA: LEADING LAWYERS ON INTERPRETING INTERNATIONAL BANKING LAWS,
ADVISING CLIENTS ON ENTERING LATIN AMERICAN CAPITAL MARKETS, AND
PREDICTING FINANCIAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT AND STABILITY (2009), available at
2009 WL 2511990, at *5.
101. DEMAREST E ALMEIDA, supra note 89, § 2:18.
102. Id. § 2:19.
103. Id.
104. Id. § 2:25.
105. Id.
106. Id. § 1:1.
107. Id.
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become a publicly held company.108 Thus, if the private equity firm
aspires to exit the investment through an IPO, it must either structure the
target as a corporation from the beginning or convert the limited liability
company into a corporation at a later stage.
a. Corporate Governance
The Brazilian Corporation Law sets only minimum standards of
corporate governance.109 Mainly, the corporate governance standards of
Brazilian corporations are influenced by the segment of the Brazilian
stock exchange BOVESPA on which the company is listed or may
aspire to become listed in the future. Law No. 10.303/01 (Oct. 31, 2001)
created three corporate governance levels for listing on BOVESPA110 in
order to enhance the valuation of companies’ securities and attract
investors to the market by strengthening transparency and confidence in
the stock market.111
In order to obtain a listing on one of these three segments, the
corporation must voluntarily abide by higher corporate governance and
disclosure requirements than those mandated by general Brazilian
corporate law.112 The lowest level of corporate governance out of these
three segments is mandated by Nivel 1. The issuer must (1) ensure that
at least 25% of the issuer’s shares are in free float; (2) conduct public
offerings in a way that promotes widespread ownership; (3) provide
quarterly disclosures; (4) comply with stricter disclosure requirements in
regard to insider transactions; (5) file shareholder agreements and stock
option plans with BOVESPA; and (6) make a schedule of corporate
events available to shareholders.113 In addition to the Nivel 1
requirements, a Nivel 2 issuer must: (1) grant tagalong rights for all
shareholders in the event of a transfer of control; (2) grant voting rights
to holders of preferred stock for certain corporate restructurings; (3)
establish a board of directors that has at least five members and that
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
See generally Ribeiro, supra note 54.
Tavares, supra note 100, at *5.
Érica Gorga, Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership from Concentrated
Towards Dispersed Ownership? Evidence from Brazil and Consequences for Emerging
Countries, 29 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 439, 450 (2009).
112. DEMAREST E ALMEIDA, supra note 89 § 2:32.
113. Id.
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requires 1/5 of the board to be comprised of independent (outside)
directors; (4) prepare annual financial statements in English and in
compliance with U.S. GAAP or IFRS; and (5) agree to arbitration for
disputes between the corporation and its shareholders.114
Finally, to obtain a listing on the Novo Mercado, in addition to
complying with all Nivel 1 and Nivel 2 requirements, the issuer must
issue only common shares.115 At first, the market did not respond as
expected to the new segments with enhanced corporate governance
levels, with only two companies listed on Novo Mercado, three on Nivel
2, and 31 on Nivel 1.116 This began to change, however, in 2004 and
now 126 companies are listed on Novo Mercado, 19 on Nivel 2, and 32
on Nivel 1.117 230 companies are still listed on the traditional
BOVESPA segment.118 Research by Érica Gorga showed that young
companies and first-time issuers constitute the vast majority of
companies listed on Novo Mercado, whereas older, established
companies are reluctant to migrate to higher levels of corporate
governance.119 While most private equity firms invest in non-public
targets that do not yet need to comply with Novo Mercado’s high
corporate governance standards, the prospect of a future listing may
already induce companies to adhere to certain governance practices at an
earlier stage. The evidence from the Novo Mercado listings seems to
suggest that management of younger companies in particular are more
willing to subject themselves to stricter corporate governance best
practices.
One particular concern when investing in Brazilian companies is
the often concentrated ownership. Research by Sílvia Mourthé
Valadares and Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal found that in 2000, 62.5%
in a sample of 325 companies were controlled by a single shareholder
who owned, on average, 74% of the voting shares, and even firms
without a single majority shareholder were often controlled by three

114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Gorga, supra note 111, at 452.
Company Search, BM&FBOVESPA, http://www.bmfbovespa.com.br/cias-lista
das/empresas-listadas/BuscaEmpresaListada.aspx?Idioma=en-us (last visited Nov. 13,
2012).
118. Id.
119. Gorga, supra note 111, at 455-56.
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major shareholders.120 Significant agency problems can occur because
controlling shareholders may tend to extract value from the company at
the expense of minority shareholders.121 Such private benefits do not
necessarily have to be pecuniary. In Brazil, the prestige that comes with
the control of a company can be an important factor, especially when the
company has always been in control of the management’s family.122 An
entrepreneur who has built a business without the need of outside
capital, and thus without accountability to others, may be difficult to
convince to keep personal and business accounts separate and maintain
proper records.123 Yet a private equity investor must often rely on the
experience and expertise of the incumbent management to run the target
company. Thus, the accountability of the target’s management must be
carefully evaluated during the due diligence process and an investment,
despite substantial growth opportunity, should not be made where the
tension between family management and the outside investor cannot be
overcome.
b. Enforcement of Contractual Rights
A private equity firm that takes only a minority position in the
target company as part of its growth capital strategy must be able to rely
on contractual provisions (control rights) that protect its investment.124
Brazilian law explicitly permits the use of different classes of shares
with different rights conferred to each class,125 thus enabling a flexible
deal structure. Shareholder agreements governing the purchase and sale
of shares, preemptive rights and the exercise of voting rights, are
enforceable against third parties as long as they are filed with the
corporation.126 The sale of a shareholder’s right to vote constitutes a

120. Sílvia Mourthé Valadares & Ricardo Pereira Câmara Leal, Ownership and
Control Structure of Brazilian Companies 22 (Working Paper, 2000), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=213409.
121. Gorga, supra note 43, at 818.
122. Id. at 823.
123. Leeds & Sunderland, supra note 10, at 114.
124. See supra Part II.B.
125. Ribeiro, supra note 54, at 365.
126. DEMAREST E ALMEIDA, supra note 89, § 1:20.
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crime under Brazilian law and can therefore be the subject of neither a
shareholder agreement nor a bylaw.127
However, developing countries with a civil law origin like Brazil
are believed to offer a low level of contractual protections and
enforcement to private equity investors.128 The Brazilian court system
tends to operate very slowly,129 and the right of parties to appeal a
judgment continually delays obtaining a final judgment significantly.130
In addition, there are not enough courts and judges to handle the many
and diverse cases that arise.131 Lastly, there is no system of precedent as
in common law legal systems, which impedes the ability to assess the
likelihood of success in litigation.132
Despite this less than favorable framework, Cinthia Daniela Bertan
Ribeiro has found in her study that private equity and venture capital
investors are increasingly open to minority positions and employ all of
the protective control rights usually found in private equity
investments.133 She explains this phenomena in part with the fact that
private equity firms base their decision on the quality of the target and
the relationship with the target’s management: through detailed due
diligence and substantial efforts to develop a functioning relationship
with management, disputes, and thus the necessity to rely on the
contractual protections in court, can be avoided.134 Another, and
probably more important, reason is the broad use of arbitration in private
equity investment.135 The Brazilian Arbitration Law was passed in 1996
and established clear rules supporting arbitration in Brazil.136 The parties
can avoid the delay and lack of expertise of the Brazilian courts by
selecting well-qualified arbitrators and restricting the right to appeal the

127.
128.

Id.
Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial
Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private Equity, 120 Q. J. ECON. 223, 224-25
(2005).
129. Maurizio Levi-Minzi & Pedro Seraphim, Doing Deals in Brazil: A Primer, in
DOING DEALS IN EMERGING MARKETS: BRIC & BEYOND 101, 105 (2010) (PLI Corp. L.
& Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1826, 2010).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 106.
133. Ribeiro, supra note 54, at 370-72.
134. Id. at 373.
135. Id.
136. Tavares, supra note 100, at *4.
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arbitral award.137 The Brazilian Supreme Court in 2001 held the
Arbitration Act to be constitutional, and arbitration clauses are now
widely used in private equity agreements with Brazilian firms and often
select Brazil-based arbitral tribunals that belong to Brazilian institutions
(e.g., Sao Paulo’s stock exchange BOVESPA) or international chambers
of commerce.138
4. Exiting from the Brazilian Investment
The capital market reforms beginning in 2001 have had a
substantial effect on Brazil’s IPO market. From 2003 to 2008, 103 IPOs
were conducted on the Brazilian capital markets, accompanied by 95
secondary public offerings.139 In the record year of 2007, 64 companies
raised $33.3 billion in IPOs.140 While the Brazilian IPO market did not
escape the consequences of the financial crisis, with only 4 IPOs in
2008, 6 in 2009, and 11 in 2010, it rebounded in 2011 with 22 IPOs.141
The overwhelming majority of IPOs has been listed on Novo Mercado.
In 2007 alone, 41 out of the 64 companies conducting an IPO listed on
Novo Mercado, compared to 7 on Nivel 2, and 8 on Nivel 1.142 These
numbers show that Novo Mercado provides an excellent exit
opportunity for private equity investors who, during the term of the
investment, improve corporate governance and reporting standards in
order to comply with the high Novo Mercado standards. Additionally,
commitment to a high corporatate government level has a positive effect
on share value,143 which might lead to higher returns for private equity
investors.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Ribeiro, supra note 54, at 374-75.
Tavares, supra note 100, at *5.
Paulo Winterstein, Brazil January IPO Plans Signal A ‘Good Year,’ Investors
Say, FOXBUSINESS, Jan. 19, 2011, http://www.foxbusiness.com/markets/2011/01/19/br
azil-january-ipo-plans-signal-good-year-investors-say/.
141. Public Offers and IPOs, BOVESPA, available at http://bmfbovespa.comuniquese.com.br/en/list.aspx?idCanal=Sx5wS/XXeGxBbiBmVMzlTA==.
142. Bovespa Facts & Figures 2, BOVESPA 2-3 (Dec. 2007), http://www.bestbrazil.o
rg.br/pages/publications/bovespa/FACTS_vers%C3%A3o_final.pdf.
143. See Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & George G. Pennacchi, Can Voluntary
Market Reforms Promote Efficient Corporate Governance? Evidence from Firms’
Migration to Premium Markets in Brazil 17-20 (Jan. 25, 2005), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=678282; see generally Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira &
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In order to conduct a public offering in Brazil, as a general rule,
both the issuer and the offering itself must be registered with CVM, and
an intermediary must be responsible for distribution, clearing and
settlement.144 An offering is deemed to be public if any sales efforts are
conducted in Brazil that target the “general public,” or if Brazilian
investors have access to the offering information and no precautions
have been taken to prevent such access.145 “General public” means “a
class, category, or group of people, even if individualized, either
resident, domiciled, or incorporated in Brazil, except for those having
close, regular, and prior commercial, credit, corporate, or labor relations
with the issuer.”146 In 2009, the CVM promulgated an exemption for
small offerings targeted at no more than 50 qualified investors,147 but
only if no more than 20 such qualified investors subscribe, and all
material information is disclosed without the need of a formal
prospectus.148 However, equity securities are excluded from this
exemption.149
If a Brazilian corporation wishes to offer depository receipts
abroad, it must be publicly held and receive authorization from CVM
and BACEN.150 The securities underlying the receipts must be stored
with a depository in Brazil.151

Lucas Ayres B. de C. Barros, Corporate Governance Quality and Firm Value in Brazil
(June 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=923310 (finding a positive and
significant influence of corporate governance quality on a firm’s market value).
144. Thiago Giantomassi & Carolina T. Joop, Securities and Capital Markets, in
BUSINESS LAWS OF BRAZIL, supra note 89f, § 2:14.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. § 2:15 (“[Q]ualified investors are: (i) financial institutions (ii) insurance
companies and capitalization companies, (iii) private pension-fund organizations with
public or private capital, (iv) individuals or legal entities holding financial investments
which exceed R $300,000 (approximately 100,000), and that additionally invest at least
R $1,000,000 in the exempted offering, (v) investment funds, and (vi) portfolio
managers and securities advisers authorized by CVM, in relation to their own
monies.”).
148. Id. § 2:15.
149. Id.
150. Id. § 2:13.
151. Id.
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B. RUSSIA
Among the BRIC countries, Russia suffered the most from the
financial crisis. Russia’s GDP dropped by 7.9% in 2009, making it only
the twelfth largest economy (after being the eighth in 2008).152 For this
reason, commentators have questioned whether Russia still belongs in
the BRIC. An article published in Forbes Magazine argued that Russia’s
overdependence on the oil and gas market was exposed when the oil
bubble burst in mid-2008.153 The article further held that corruption,
government interference in the private sector and the erosion of civil
liberties are reasons why Russia has performed poorly through the
financial crisis compared to the other BRIC countries, and that these
factors will continue to impede growth in Russia in the future.154
However, unlike in the financial crisis of 1998, big banks and
companies remained intact, and Russia still has the third largest foreign
currency reserves.155 Goldman Sachs’ Jim O’Neill opined in 2009 that,
while Russia’s performance was disappointing in the financial crisis, it
deserves its place in the BRIC if it recovers quickly.156 One such
indicator may be that Russian stocks increased by 20% in 2010, the
largest gain among the BRIC countries.157 Growth rates of 4.3% in both
2010 and 2011 also indicate Russia’s recovery.158
The macroeconomic picture in Russia is mirrored by the
development of the private equity industry. While total private equity
investment rose by more than 300% from $0.8 billion in 2007 to $2.6
billion in 2008, it dropped dramatically in 2009 to only $0.2 million,
below the 2004 level.159 Unlike in the other BRIC countries, private
equity investment did not recover fully to the 2008 level in 2010.160
152.
153.

WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
Taking the ‘R’ Out of BRIC, FORBES (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/
2010/02/24/russia-brazil-bric-entrepreneurs-finance-wharton.html.
154. Id.
155. Ben Aris, Russia: The unloved Bric country, TELEGRAPH, RUSSIA NOW (Mar. 4,
2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sponsored/russianow/business/7369006/Russia-theunloved-Bric-country.html.
156. O’Neill & Stupnytska, supra note 14, at 4, 27.
157. Tai Adelaja, Ripe for Investment, RUSSIAPROFILE (Dec. 30, 2010), http://russia
profile.org/business/a1293730860.html.
158. WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
159. EMPEA, supra note 11.
160. Id.
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1. Foreign Direct Investment
FDI into Russia was impacted significantly by the financial crisis.
After rising to $75 billion from 2004 until 2008, it cut in half to $36.8
billion in 2009 and recovered only to a small degree in 2010.161
FDI in Russia is regulated by the Law No. 160-FZ, July 9, 1999,
On Foreign Investment in the Russian Federation162 (“Foreign
Investment Law”) and Law No. 57-FZ, April 29, 2008, On Foreign
Investment in Business Entities of Strategic Importance for National
Defense and National Security (“Strategic Entities Law”).163 The
Foreign Investment Law defines FDI as “the acquisition by a foreign
investor of at least 10 per cent stake . . . in the . . . capital of a
commercial organization” and restricts FDI based on the “protection of
fundamental constitutional principles, morality, health, or the rights and
legal interests of others, or to provide for the defense of the country and
security of the state.”164 While the Foreign Investment Law left foreign
investors with a lot of uncertainty about when the government would
invoke its authority to restrict FDI,165 the new Strategic Entities Law
now names 42 areas in which FDI is restricted where such investment
leads to the establishment of direct or indirect control.166 Among the
“strategic entities” are those that operate in, for example, nuclear
energy, intelligence operations, certain activities in aviation and
aerospace, radio and television broadcasting, as well as the publication
of printed periodicals.167 A foreign investor168 seeking to invest in a
161. U.S. & FOREIGN COM. SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF COM., DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA:
A COUNTRY COMMERCIAL GUIDE FOR U.S. COMPANIES, CH. 6, § OPENNESS TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT (2012) [hereinafter USFCS Russia].
162. Jesse Heath, Strategic Protectionism? National Security and Foreign
Investment in the Russian Federation, 41 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 465, 478, n.103
(2009).
163. Natalia Drebezgina, Overview of Regulations Applicable to Mergers and
Acquisitions in the Russian Federation, in DOING DEALS IN EMERGING MARKETS: BRIC
& BEYOND 2010 (PLI Corp. L. & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 1826, 2010).
164. Heath, supra note 162, at 478-79 (citing Law on Foreign Investment in the
Russian Federation arts. 2, 4-15, No. 160-FZ, July 9, 1999).
165. Id. at 479.
166. Drebezgina, supra note 163, at 179.
167. Id. at 170 n.11; for a more detailed list, see Heath, supra note 162, at 484-86.
168. Marat Altynbaev, Investments in the Russian Federation, in CORPORATE
COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA § 18:1 (Tomi P. Asanti et al. eds., 2d
ed. 2010) (“[A] foreign investor is: a foreign legal entity the civil legal capacity of
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“strategic entity” must obtain approval from the Federal Anti-Monopoly
Service (“FAS”) and the Government Commission on Foreign
Investment.169 A foreign entity can be held to establish control through
various means, including (1) the acquisition of more than 50% of the
target’s voting stock, or a lesser percentage if this is sufficient to
exercise control; (2) the right to appoint the CEO, or more than half of
the target’s management or board of directors; or (3) the performance of
management duties by the foreign investor.170
Though the new Strategic Entities Law appears to be restrictive,
commentators point to the improved clarity and transparency resulting
from the legislation.171 However, legislation can be only as good as its
implementation, an area in which Russia still needs substantial
improvement.172 The Russian government has announced that it plans to
ease access to certain sectors in 2011, including food, pharmaceutical,
banking and natural resources sectors.173
2. Takeovers of Public Targets
An investor who acquires more than 30% of a Russian open joint
stock company (“OJSC”), the equivalent of a publicly held
corporation,174 is required to make a mandatory tender offer (“MTO”) to
the remaining shareholders.175 A tender offer aimed at acquiring more
than 30% of the target’s stock must be made by way of a voluntary

which is determined in accordance with the legislation of the state in which it is
founded, and which, in accordance with the legislation of this state, is entitled to invest
in the Russian Federation; a foreign organization which is not a legal entity, the civil
legal capacity of which is determined in accordance with the legislation of the state in
which it is founded, and which, in accordance with the legislation of this state, is
entitled to invest in the Russian Federation; a foreign citizen whose civil legal capacity
and activity are determined in accordance with the legislation of his/her national state
and who, in accordance with the legislation of this state, is entitled to invest in the
Russian Federation.”)
169. Heath, supra note 162, at 486.
170. Drebezgina, supra note 163, at 182.
171. See Heath, supra note 162, at 494.
172. Id. at 500-01; see infra Part II.B.3.c.
173. Adelaja, supra note 157.
174. See infra Part II.B.3.
175. Drebezgina, supra note 163, at 168.
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tender offer (“VTO”).176 Both MTO and VTO must be accompanied by
extensive documentation regarding the offer, and the minimum purchase
price is determined based on the historic trading price and/or the price
paid in previous acquisitions.177 If the acquirer receives more than 95%
of the target’s stock in the MTO or VTO, the acquirer may squeeze out
the remaining minority shareholders, and the shareholders have the right
to request the acquirer to purchase their shares.178
3. Corporate Law and Legal Enforcement
The most common forms of legal entities used in Russia are the
limited liability company (“LLC”) and the joint stock company
(“JSC”).179 A JSC can be organized as an OJSC, a public corporation
with usually a large shareholder base, or as a closed joint stock
corporation (“CJSC”), which must have 50 shareholders or less.180
Unlike an OJSC, a CJSC cannot conduct a public offering of its shares
and shareholders have a preemptive right to purchase shares sold by
other shareholders of the CJSC (right of first refusal).181 In return, a
CJSC is subject to less stringent disclosure requirements than an
OJSC.182 Consequently, it may be preferable for a private equity investor
to organize the target company as a CJSC upon investment in order to
reduce regulatory costs. Moreover, the right of first refusal protects a
private equity investor who takes a minority position against dilution.
Should the investor wish to exit by way of an IPO, however, the target
would need to be converted into an OJSC.

176.
177.
178.
179.

Id.
Id. at 169-70.
Id. at 174.
Sergei Orlov & Emily Barlass, Corporate Legislation, in CORPORATE
COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN RUSSIA, supra note 168, § 18:1.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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a. Corporate Governance
Quick privatization of former state-owned enterprises has led to a
high ownership concentration in Russian companies.183 Studies found
that about 40% of the Russian industry is controlled by only 22 business
groups, which themselves are in the hands of “oligarchs.”184
Consequently, conflicts generally do not arise between shareholders and
management, but rather between controlling and minority
shareholders.185 In a survey by C5 and Squire, Sanders & Dempsey
L.L.P., a majority of those surveyed named untrustworthy partners in the
target companies as the primary reason for writing off deals.186 The
combination of high ownership concentration and weak legal institutions
increases the value of control, making a LBO more desirable.187 Buyouts
by private equity firms, however, remain rare due to the lack of
necessary leverage.188
Another “layer” of conflict is added by the growing trend of
government influence in private businesses to the extent that
representatives of regional and local government authorities are included
on the companies’ boards.189 Regional governments often employ
provincial protectionism by, for example, interfering with efficient
restructurings of distressed companies or extracting benefits from large
local companies in return for protection from creditors and foreign
competitors.190
On the upside, low corporate governance in many potential Russian
target companies offers substantial opportunities for private equity firms
willing to make the investment to unlock value and thus earn high
returns. Russian companies are often undervalued and the
implementation of higher governance standards can achieve a

183. See Olga Lazareva, Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, A Survey of
Corporate Governance in Russia 4 (Ctr. for Econ. & Fin. Res. at New Econ. School,
Working Paper No. 103, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997965.
184. Id. at 5.
185. Id. at 13.
186. Christopher Rose, C5/Squire Sanders CIS Private Equity Report 4 (Autumn
2007), http://www.ssd.com/reprints/CIS_Private_Equity_Report.pdf.
187. Lazareva et al., supra note 183, at 13.
188. Rose, supra note 186, at 2.
189. Lazareva et al., supra note 183, at 13, 18.
190. Id. at 29.
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significantly higher valuation.191 How this can be achieved through
shareholder activism was demonstrated by the Hermitage Fund.192 By
continuously generating news coverage about corporate governance
abuses in reputable international media outlets such as The Wall Street
Journal and The Financial Times, the fund was able to use the
controlling shareholders’ concern for their international reputation in
order to invoke corporate governance changes.193
Since 1996, Russia has amended its corporate law repeatedly in an
attempt to strengthen minority shareholder rights and attract more
foreign capital.194 Among the amendments were anti-dilution provisions,
such as the need for shareholder approval for substantial issues of new
common stock, as well as governing rights, such as supermajorities, the
right for 2%-shareholders to propose topics for the shareholders’
meeting and the right to include candidates to be elected for the
corporation’s governing bodies.195 In addition, the amendments provided
for protection against self-dealing through mandated shareholder
approval of interested transactions, and for access to the courts in order
to challenge improper resolutions and to bring claims against the
directors or managers on behalf of the corporation (derivative action).196
To compliment the protections afforded in the JSC Law, the FFMS
introduced a nonbinding Code of Corporate Conduct.197 Among the
principles laid out in the Code of Corporate Conduct are: (1) effective
exercise of shareholder rights; (2) equal treatment of shareholders; (3)
effective control of management by the board of directors, and
accountability of directors; (4) full and accurate disclosure of
information about the company; (5) maximization of company value;
and (6) efficient control over business and financial operations of the
company.198

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id. at 2.
Id. at 30.
Id.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 34-35.
Id. at 35.
Lazareva et al., supra note 183, at 33.
Id. at 40-42.
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b. Enforceability of Contractual Rights
Until recently, a major concern, in particular for private equity
investors, was the unenforceability of shareholders’ agreements.199
Private equity firms typically include veto rights, drag along rights, tag
along rights, and other covenants and warranties in a shareholder’s
agreement to protect themselves from dilution and to ensure that the
target company fulfills specific performance benchmarks.200 Under the
Russian Civil Code, however, only warranties with respect to the shares
being acquired are enforceable.201 Moreover, a Russian court held in the
famous Megafon case that shareholders’ agreements were unenforceable
under Russian law even if the parties agreed on a governing law under
which such rights would be enforceable.202 In 2009, an amendment to
JSC Law finally provided for the enforceability of shareholders’
agreements. However, the statutory text does not go into much detail
and significant uncertainties remain.203 In particular, the amendment
does not afford the parties the right to choose the governing law.204
Consequently, under Megafon, a choice-of-law clause is still
unenforceable and the contract will be reviewed under Russian law.205
Moreover, a shareholders’ agreement is binding only on the parties, and
not on the corporation.206 Thus, a breach of a shareholders’ agreement
does not affect the validity of a resolution made by one of the
corporation’s bodies.207

199. See Conaire Michael Hallisy, Riches to Rubles: Problems Russia Must Address
to Increase Direct Investment from U.S. Private Equity, 16 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L.
137, 160 (2008).
200. Id. at 160; see supra Part II.B.
201. Hallisy, supra note 199, at 160.
202. Tatiana Neveeva, Corporations, in CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING
BUSINESS IN RUSSIA, supra note 168, § 11:58.
203. Id. § 11:59.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Orlov & Barlass, supra note 179, § 12:14.
207. Id.
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c. Reliability of the Legal System
While corporate laws are in substance comparable to Western
standards, implementation and enforcement by Russian authorities
remain a major concern for foreign investors.208
Russia’s judiciary faces several challenges. First, Russia’s body of
law is complex and often conflicting.209 This is exacerbated by the fact
that the Russian Federation is comprised of 88 subunits, 21 republics, 49
regions, 10 autonomous districts, 6 territories, Moscow, St. Petersburg
and 1 autonomous region, each possessing some degree of rule-making
authority.210 Second, lack of funding in the judiciary causes Russian
judges to be burdened by a heavy caseload and insufficient training.211
In response, judges often dismiss cases prematurely for technical
reasons or make ill-informed decisions on the merits.212 Third, political
pressure and corruption in the legal system affect judicial decision
making.213 In addition, U.S. investors are confronted with the fact that
Russian judges are trained under their civil law system, which results in
a more literal interpretation of statutes and a lack of firm precedent.
While this is not limited to Russia, it seems to contribute to U.S.
investors’ discomfort with the Russian legal system.214 For these
reasons, private equity firms are well advised to subject their investment
to international arbitration. International arbitral awards are enforceable
under Russian law,215 and Russia is also a signatory to the 1958 New
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards.216
Corruption remains a major concern in Russia despite the
government’s assurance to fight corruption and to create a more

208.
209.

Lazareva et al., supra note 183, at 12.
Hallisy, supra note 199, at 170-71; see also USFCS Russia, supra note 161, at
ch. 6, § Dispute Settlement.
210. Hallisy, supra note 199, at 170-71.
211. USFCS Russia, supra note 161, at ch. 6, § Dispute Settlement.
212. Id.
213. Id.; Hallisy, supra note 199, at 168.
214. Hallisy, supra note 199, at 168-69.
215. USFCS Russia, supra note 161, at ch. 6, § Dispute Settlement.
216. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law (UNCITRAL), Status, 1958 Convention
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.o
rg/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited Mar.
25, 2011).
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favorable investment climate.217 In 2011, the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index ranked Russia 143rd out of 182 nations,
down from 90th place in 2004, and Russia came in last out of 54
countries surveyed in PricewaterhouseCooper’s 2009 Global Economic
Crime Survey.218 By comparison, the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index ranks Brazil 73rd, China 75th, and India
95th.219
As a result of these concerns, private equity firms generally do not
invest directly in Russia. Rather, investors use an offshore holding
company in which both the private equity fund and remaining
shareholders of the target company invest.220 Primary offshore
jurisdictions that U.S. investors use when investing in Russia include the
Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey.221 Aside
from beneficial tax treatment, such a structure allows investors to
employ all the incentives and protections usually found in private equity
investments.222
4. Exiting from the Russian Investment
The first IPO on a Russian exchange was conducted in 2002 by
OAO RBC Information Systems.223 After a slow start to new offerings,
the market picked up significantly in 2006 and 2007, with about forty
IPOs in these two years alone.224 However, liquidity remains relatively
low. Only three state-owned companies provided for over 60% of the
IPO volume.225
Equity securities are listed on one of several listing segments,
depending on the recent trading volume.226 Thus, first-time issuers need
217.
218.
219.

USFCS Russia, supra note 161, at ch. 6, § Openness to Foreign Investment.
Id. at ch. 6, § Corruption.
Corruption Perception Index 2011, TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
available at http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011/results.
220. Hallisy, supra note 199, at 157.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Oxana Derisheva & Alexey Fedorov, Capital Raising by Russian Companies
on the Russian Stock Market, in CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO DOING BUSINESS IN
RUSSIA, supra note 168, § 17:5.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. § 17:6.
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to first list on the lowest segments and subsequently transition to higher
segments once the trading volume is established.227 The listing segment
determines what type of investors can invest in the securities. For
example, pension funds and insurance companies may only invest in
securities listed in the highest listing segment A1.228 Therefore, these
institutional investors cannot participate in an IPO.
The majority of Russian initial issuers, however, list their shares on
foreign exchanges, traditionally on the London Stock Exchange
(“LSE”).229 Investors in London are relatively familiar with the Russian
market and there is a track record of Russian issuers who listed on the
LSE.230 In January 2010, UC Rusal was the first Russian company to
conduct an IPO on the Hong Kong Exchange (HKEx), potentially
paving the way for other Russian issuers to follow.231 Ultimately, an IPO
on a global exchange can only be successful if the issuer can
demonstrate “quality in all operational areas, quality corporate
governance, quality information disclosure, quality risk management,
quality internal controls and quality in all other aspects of their
business.”232
Issuers who wish to conduct an IPO abroad (likely through an
ADR/GDR program) must obtain authorization from the Russian
Federal Financial Markets Service (“FFMS”). Such authorization is
granted only if the company has also issued shares on a domestic stock
exchange and the number of shares issued abroad does not exceed 30%
of the issuers total same class of shares.233 These requirements were
introduced in response to the strong preference of Russian issuers to list
on a foreign exchange.234 The FFMS further limited the percentage of
shares that can be traded on a foreign exchange in January 2010.235
However, companies may be able to circumvent these requirements by

227.
228.
229.

Id.
Id.
Maxim Lubomudrov & Simon Molyneux, The Russian IPO Market in 2010,
WORLD FINANCE REVIEW, May 2010, http://www.worldfinancereview.com/may2010/th
erussianipomarketin2010.html; see also STOWELL, supra note 17, at 148.
230. Lubomudrov & Molyneux, supra note 229.
231. Lubomudrov & Molyneux, supra note 229.
232. Lubomudrov & Molyneux, supra note 229.
233. Lazareva et al., supra note 183 at 7.
234. Id.
235. Lubomudrov & Molyneux, supra note 229.
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using a holding company in a foreign jurisdiction.236 This may be a
viable exit strategy for private equity firms who structure their
investment through an offshore holding company.237 It is thus argued
that reforms directed at building trust in the domestic capital markets,
combined with strict enforcement, would strengthen Russia’s IPO
market more efficiently.238
C. INDIA
India’s economy was affected much less by the financial crisis than
developed economies. After reporting GDP growth rates between 9.3%
and 9.6% from 2005 to 2007, growth dropped to 5.1% in 2008, but
recovered in 2009 to 8.2%.239 In 2010, GDP growth returned to precrisis levels.240
Private equity investment in India has increased substantially since
2004 and reached $9.9 billion in 2007, the highest total investment in
private equity among the BRIC countries.241 After dropping to $4 billion
in 2009, investments into private companies regained momentum and
reached $6.2 billion in both 2010 and 2011.242 Due to the relatively
small capital base of most unlisted Indian companies, investors must
allow for smaller deal sizes.243 Sectors that need extensive investment in
infrastructure (such as telecommunications), however, offer larger
investment opportunities.244
1. Foreign Direct Investment
FDI inflows into India have increased exponentially in recent years,
totaling $43.4 billion in 2008 from $7.6 billion in 2005.245 A series of
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

Id.
See supra Part II.B.
Lazareva et al., supra note 183 at n.6.
WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
Id.
EMPEA, supra note 11.
Id.
Vaibhav Parikh, Private Equity Fund Investments in Indian Companies, in
ADVANCED VENTURE CAPITAL 2009 (2009), available at 1735 PLI/Corp 249, 256
(West).
244. Id.
245. WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
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policy reforms have contributed to an improved environment for foreign
investors.246 Foreign investment in Indian securities is governed by the
Foreign Exchange Management Act of 1999 (“FEMA”) and the
regulations promulgated under it by the Reserve Bank of India
(“RBI”).247 Investments in Indian equities can be made through two
alternative routes: the Automatic Route, which does not require approval
by the Indian government, and the Approval Route.248 The Automatic
Route is available to foreign investors in certain sectors and up to a
certain percentage called “Sectoral Caps.”249 FDI is prohibited in the
following sectors: (1) business of chit fund; (2) nidhi company; (3) real
estate business; (4) trading in Transferable Development Rights
(“TDRs”); (5) retail trading; (6) atomic energy; (7) lottery business; (8)
gambling and betting; (9) and agriculture.250
A foreign private equity firm may also register with SEBI as a
Foreign Venture Capital Investor (“FVCI”).251 Registration as a FVCI
has substantial benefits for the private equity investor both when
acquiring the target and when exiting the investment through an IPO,
which are discussed below in Parts II.C.2 and II.C.4, respectively.
However, a registered FVCI is subject to the following conditions: (1) it
must disclose its investment strategy to SEBI and achieve its investment
targets by the end of a set life cycle; (2) at least 66.67% of the FVCI’s
funds must be invested in unlisted equities; and (3) no more than 33.3%
246. Shardul S. Shroff, An Overview of the Legal Regime Governing Capital
Markets in India and Current Developments, in DOING BUSINESS IN INDIA 2009:
CRITICAL LEGAL ISSUES FOR U.S. COMPANIES (2009), available at 1720 PLI/Corp 51,
89 (West).
247. Id. at 90.
248. Shivpriya Nanda, Structuring a Venture Capital/Private Equity Transaction
into India, in OUTLOOK ON INDIA 2010: DELIVERING ON THE PROMISE IN TURBULENT
TIMES (2010), available at 1815 PLI/Corp 135, 139 (Westlaw).
249. Id. at 140; see also U.S. & Foreign Com. Serv., U.S. Dep’t of Com., Doing
Business in India: 2010 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies ch. 6, §
Openness to Foreign Investment (2010) [hereafter USFCS India]. See Ketan Kothari,
Investments in India--Risks & Mitigation Strategies, in OUTLOOK IN INDIA: DELIVERING
ON THE PROMISE IN TURBULENT TIMES (Practical Law Institute Course Handbook,
2010), available at PLI Corp. 337, 352 (Annex), for a detailed list of all sectoral caps
and their respective route as of May 31, 2010.
250. Nanda, supra note 247, at 141.
251. Id.; see also Sajai Singh, Venture Capital Investment in the Indian Market, in
ADVANCED VENTURE CAPITAL 2010 (2010), available at 1853 PLI/Corp 989, 996
(West).
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may be invested by way of subscription to shares offered in an IPO, debt
instruments of its portfolio companies or stock in a listed distressed
company.252
Special rules are in place for portfolio investments by foreign
institutional investors (“FII”).253 A FII can invest up to 10% of the
equity capital of an Indian company and the aggregate investment of FII
in a single company may not exceed 24%.254 The Indian company may
increase this limit up to the Sectoral Cap by a board resolution that
receives shareholder approval.255 Subject to these ownership restrictions,
a FII may freely purchase and sell securities issued by any Indian
company, and realize and repatriate capital gains.256
2. Takeovers of Public Targets
A traditional LBO, in which the acquisition of the target is financed
through loans collateralized by the target’s assets, is prohibited under
Indian law.257 However, the private equity investor can increase leverage
shortly after the acquisition of the target through a recapitalization, in
which the investor causes the target to make a dividend payment to the
fund financed by debt.258
An investor seeking to acquire a stake in a listed company must
report to the target when its holdings cross thresholds at 5%, 10% and
14%.259 If an acquisition would result in ownership of 15% or more of
the voting rights of the target, the acquirer must make a public tender
offer for at least 20% of the target’s outstanding shares.260
FDI regulations generally prescribe a minimum price for foreign
investment in Indian equities, linked to the shares’ net asset value.261

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Nanda, supra note 248, at 143.
Parikh, supra note 243, at 262.
Id. at 262-63.
Id. at 263.
Shroff, supra note 246, at 94.
Nanda, supra note 248, at 157.
Id.
Kothari, supra note 249, at 343.
Id. at 343-44.
Parikh, supra note 243, at 265.
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However, a registered FVCI is exempted from this purchase price
restriction.262
3. Corporate Law and Legal Enforcement
Indian companies are governed by the Companies Act, 1956.263
Companies can be public or private, and shareholders can have limited
or unlimited liability.264 A private company is limited to fifty members
and subject to certain restrictions on the transfer of shares, including a
prohibition of a public offering of its shares.265 Its minimum paid up
capital must be Rs. 100,000 (approximately $2,200).266 A public
company must have a minimum paid up capital of Rs. 500,000
(approximately $11,000) and may not impose any restrictions on the
transferability of its shares.267
a. Corporate Governance
Even though room for improvement remains, India’s corporate
governance framework is relatively advanced for a developing
country.268 SEBI first introduced mandatory corporate governance
standards in India through Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement of Stock
Exchanges, which contains corporate governance requirements for
exchange-traded companies.269 Under Clause 49, the Chairman of the
Board should be a non-executive director and at least one-third of the
directors should be independent, and if the chairman is an executive
director, half of the directors should be independent.270 Furthermore,
two-thirds of the members of the audit committee must be independent
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

Id; see supra Part II.C.1, for regulation of FVCIs.
Singh, supra note 251, at 1002.
Id.
Id. at 1003.
Id.
Id.
Varun Bath, Corporate Governance in India: Past, Present, and Suggestions
for the Future, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1429, 1457 (2007); see also USFCS India, supra note
249, at ch. 6, § Transparency of Regulatory System. See John Paterson, Corporate
Governance in India in the context of the Companies Bill 2009, I.C.C.L.R. 2010, 21(2),
41-53; 21(3), 83-95; and 21(4), 131-143, for an in-depth analysis of the development of
corporate governance in India up to the Companies Bill, 2009.
269. Bath, supra note 268, at 1439.
270. Id. at 1441.
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directors.271 Finally, the exchange-traded firm must submit quarterly
compliance reports detailing the firm’s compliance with corporate
governance standards.272 The Companies Bill 2009, which had not yet
been enacted by the end of 2011,273 makes further improvements, mainly
in the areas of independent directors, board committees, director duties
and liabilities, and internal control.274
Some Indian companies are owned by large families which may
complicate deal negotiations.275 The process of getting every managing
member of the family on board and adequately incentivized can take up
a substantial amount of time.276
b. Enforceability of Contractual Rights
India is a common law country and U.S. investors can thus be
comfortable with the availability and enforceability of contractual
protections.277 Investors can enter into shareholders’ agreements, and
most instruments used by private equity firms to ensure returns and
align incentives278 are available under Indian law. Besides common
stock, investors are free to use convertible preferred shares, convertible
debentures or warrants.279 For purposes of FDI restrictions it is
important to keep in mind, however, that fully convertible shares or
debentures are deemed equity and thus count towards possible FDI
caps.280 Warrants, on the other hand, do not count towards FDI caps and
can therefore be used as “stopgap instruments” in hopes that sector caps
will be eased in the future.281 However, should the investor choose to
exit by way of an IPO, outstanding warrants have to be forfeited as all
271.
272.
273.

Id. at 1441-42.
Id. at 1442.
See, e.g., Gov’t hopeful of getting Cos Bill passed in Winter Session, FIRSTPOST
(Nov. 11, 2011), http://www.firstpost.com/economy/govt-hopeful-of-getting-cos-billpassed-in-winter-session-140544.html.
274. See Paterson, supra note 268, at 49-52.
275. Parikh, supra note 243, at 257.
276. Id.
277. Singh, supra note 251, at 993.
278. See supra Part II.B.
279. Parikh, supra note 243, at 283; see also Singh, supra note 251, at 1003-05,
1012.
280. Parikh, supra note 243, at 283-84.
281. Id. at 285.
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convertible securities must be converted into equity shares prior to an
IPO under Indian securities laws.282
Private equity investors commonly employ a ratchet as one means
to protect against dilution. Such a provision stipulates that in the event
the company issues additional shares to a third party at a lower price
than the investor’s entry price, the investor will be entitled to the amount
of shares necessary to remain at the previous percentage of shares at no
additional cost.283 However, implementation of this instrument is
complicated in India because shares are prohibited from being issued at
a discount to par value.284 Thus, a similar result must be achieved
through alternative methods, such as a dividend payment to the investor
or an issuance at the least permissible price.285 Alternatively, the
investor must seek to obtain a veto right as protection against the
issuance of additional shares.286
c. Reliability of the Legal System
As in other developing countries, litigation in India is slow due to
the large number of cases judges are assigned to.287 Thus, it may be
necessary, and is possible, for the investor to rely on arbitration as India
is a signatory to the 1958 New York Convention.288 Seeking to improve
the judicial system, the Companies Bill 2009 includes a provision under
which the government is required to establish a National Company Law
Tribunal (“NCLT”).289 This tribunal would have exclusive jurisdiction
over company law cases assigned to it by law and thus provide
specialization and significant improvement to the speed in which cases
are decided.290
Another concern for investors is the tendency of excessive
rulemaking and broad authority for local authorities.291 Many important
regulatory decisions can vary from region to region and be subject to
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id. at 285-86.
Id. at 290.
Indian Companies Act, 1956 § 79 (India).
Parikh, supra note 243, at 290-92; see also Singh, supra note 251, at 1014.
Parikh, supra note 243, at 292; see also Singh, supra note 251, at 1014.
USFCS India, supra note 249, at ch. 6, § Dispute Settlement.
See UNCITRAL, supra note 216.
Paterson, supra note 268, at 47.
Id. at 48.
USFCS India, supra note 249, at ch. 6, § Transparency of Regulatory System.
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strong opposition from local and political constituencies.292 Broad
discretionary powers of governmental authorities and the lack of
transparent rules of governance also open the doors for corruption
despite extensive legislation aimed at fighting these issues.293 Only in
certain progressive areas can investors operate predominantly free from
corruption.294
4. Exiting from the Indian Investment
Beginning in 1992, India has continuously liberalized and
improved its capital markets structure.295 Companies raised a record
high of $8.8 billion in 2007, but IPOs were relatively small in size with
an average of $83 million.296 However, Reliance Power’s $3 billion IPO
in 2008 raised hopes for larger deals in the future.
Though liquidity on Indian equity markets remains low, settlement
mechanisms are comparable to international standards.297 A company
seeking to raise funds through an IPO on an Indian stock exchange must
first submit a “draft red herring prospectus” (“DRHP”) with the
Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”).298 SEBI’s comments
are then incorporated in the Red Herring Prospectus (“RHP”), which
includes a price band within which bidding can proceed.299 Once the
issue price is determined by the bidding procedure, the issuer must file
the Prospectus containing the issue price with the Registrar of
Companies (“RoC”) and the IPO can then be executed according to the
rules of the stock exchange on which listing is sought.300 Generally, all
pre-IPO share capital of an Indian company listing in India will be
locked in for a period of one year following the IPO.301 Thus, an investor
would not be able to retain its stake (or part of it) in the portfolio
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Id.
Id. at ch. 6, § Corruption.
Id.
Shroff, supra note 246, at 57.
STOWELL, supra note 17, at 149.
USFCS India, supra note 249, at ch. 6, § Efficient Capital Markets and
Portfolio Investment.
298. Shroff, supra note 246, at 62.
299. Id. at 63.
300. Id.
301. Parikh, supra note 243, at 293.
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company through the IPO and then exit its investment through a sale on
the exchange. However, an exemption from the lock-in has been carved
out for registered FVCIs who have held the investment for at least one
year prior to the IPO.302 SEBI Guidelines also include rules concerning
so-called “promoters,” which are “a person (or persons) who are in overall control of the company who is instrumental in the formulation of a
plan or program pursuant to which the securities are offered to the
public.”303 Promoters are also subject to lock-in requirements following
an IPO to ensure that parent companies continue to hold a stake in the
issuer post-IPO.304 Since private equity funds often control their targets
through shareholders’ agreements, they would easily be found to be
promoters under the SEBI Guidelines.305 However, an exemption again
exists for registered FVCIs.306
Due to the lack of liquidity on Indian capital markets, a popular
way for Indian companies to raise capital is by way of a dual-listing on
both an international and a domestic exchange. High-tech companies
typically list in the U.S., but others mainly list on LSE’s Alternate
Investment Market (“AIM”).307 AIM offers issuers the advantage of
lower entry and reporting requirements.308 In November 2010, LSE
announced that five Indian companies had listed on AIM in only ten
weeks, raising an aggregate of $344.4 million.309 Jubilant Energy’s
listing took the total number of Indian IPOs on LSE’s markets in 2010
to 28, with an aggregate amount of $2.3 billion in funds raised.310 If the
private equity investor wishes to exit through an ADR/GDR program,
the portfolio company must conform with the Issue of Foreign Currency
Convertible Bonds and Ordinary Shares (Through Depository Receipt
Mechanism) Scheme, 1993 (“1993 Scheme”).311 The Indian company

302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

Id. at 293-94; see supra Part II.C.1, for regulation of FVCIs,.
Singh, supra note 251, at 1013; Parikh, supra note 243, at 266-67.
Singh, supra note 251, at 1013.
Parikh, supra note 243, at 267.
Id.
Shroff, supra note 246, at 80; STOWELL, supra note 17, at 149.
Shroff, supra note 246, at 81.
Press Release, London Stock Exchange, Five Indian Companies Join AIM in
Ten Weeks (Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://www.londonstockexchange.com/aboutthe-exchange/media-relations/press-releases/2010/fiveindiancompaniesjoinaimintenwee
ks.htm.
310. Id.
311. Shroff, supra note 246, at 79.
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must either already be listed or simultaneously list on an Indian stock
exchange.312 Significantly, depository receipts are treated as FDI so that
foreign ownership of depository receipts is subject to Indian FDI sector
caps.313 Aside from being subject to FDI restrictions, however, Indian
companies may issue ADRs or GDRs without prior approval by Indian
regulatory authorities.314
Alternatively, the private equity investor may seek to exit through a
private sale to a strategic buyer or another private equity fund. A sale to
a later-stage private equity investor is impeded by the prohibition of
LBOs, but can be facilitated through subsequent recapitalizations.315
Moreover, the exit price a foreign entity can demand when selling to an
Indian buyer is capped under FDI regulations.316 The maximum amount
the foreign seller can ask for is the stock market price if the company is
listed, or, more likely, the net asset value of the unlisted shares.317
However, registered FVCIs are exempt from exit pricing restrictions.318
Further, promoters will not be required to make a mandatory public
offer under the Takeover Code if they buy back shares from FVCIs,
provided that the portfolio company will be subsequently listed on an
exchange.319
D. CHINA
Even China’s economy was affected by the global financial crisis.
After having growth rates above 10%, from 2003 to 2007, China’s GDP
growth rate dropped to 9.6% in 2008 and 9.2% in 2009.320 While
China’s government responded quickly with a $586 billion stimulus
package321 that brought its growth rate in 2010 back over the 10%-

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

Id.; see also Parikh, supra note 243, at 288.
Shroff, supra note 246, at 79. See supra Part II.C.1, for applicable sector caps.
Parikh, supra note 243, at 288.
See supra Part II.C.2.
Parikh, supra note 243, at 265.
See id. at 265, 294-95.
Parikh, supra note 243, at 265. See supra Part II.C.1, for regulation of FVCIs.
Id.
WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
Dexter Roberts, China’s Stimulus Package Boosts Economy, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, Apr. 22, 2009, http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/apr200
9/gb20090422_793026.htm.

2012]

PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT IN THE BRICS

1349

benchmark at 10.4%, it fell again to 9.3% in 2011.322 According to JP
Morgan Asset Management, China’s rise in productivity will be the
driving factor for high future returns in China.323
Chinese regulators have become increasingly sophisticated and,
with experience, regulations are becoming clearer and more userfriendly.324 In addition, the Ministry of Commerce (“MOC”), which has
traditionally exercised the authority to approve foreign investments, has
delegated the power to approve smaller deals to local authorities,
resulting in a faster and more certain approval process.325 In August
2008, MOC published the Foreign Investment Market Entry
Administrative Guidance Handbook, providing detailed instructions on
application procedures, documentation and applicable timelines.326
China has become the largest net importer of private equity and
venture capital investment.327 Private equity in China is usually in the
form of minority growth capital.328 LBOs face significant obstacles
because Chinese foreign invested entities (“FIE”) are subject to debt to
leverage ratios between 0.43:1.00 and 2.00:1.00 depending on the
322.
323.

WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
Jarlon Tsang, JP Morgan Asset Management: The Case for Asia: Rising
Productivity, Higher Valuations and the Strategic Imperative for Investors, in
ADVANCED VENTURE CAPITAL 2009.
324. Henry H. Liu, Recent Developments and Trends in M&A Activity Relating to
China, in BEST PRACTICES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA: LEADING
LAWYERS ON CLOSING A SUCCESSFUL TRANSACTION, NAVIGATING THE NEW ANTIMONOPOLY LAW, AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC
DOWNTURN (2010), available at 2010 WL 1976197, at *6.
325. Edward J. Epstein, New Opportunities in China’s M&A Market, in BEST
PRACTICES FOR MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA: LEADING LAWYERS ON CLOSING
A SUCCESSFUL TRANSACTION, NAVIGATING THE NEW ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, AND
UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, (2010)
available at 2010 WL 1976201, *6.
326. Thomas Y. Man, Tidal Waves and Undercurrents in Chinese Business: Recent
Developments in Key Sectors, in BEST PRACTICES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS IN CHINA: LEADING LAWYERS ON NEGOTIATING IN CHINA, MEETING THE
CHALLENGING NEEDS OF CORPORATE CLIENTS, AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF
THE ECONOMIC DOWNTURN, available at 2010 WL 1617873, at *3.
327. Joshua Aizenman & Jake Kendall, The Internationalization of Venture Capital
and Private Equity 3 (Social Science Research Network, Sept. 1, 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1275544.
328. Peter Feist, Anthony Wang & Sidney Qin, China’s Private Equity Landscape,
WEIL GOTSHAL PRIVATE EQUITY ALERT 1 (June 2008), available at http://www.weil.co
m/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=7829.

1350

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XVII

entity’s registered capital, and the MOC does not approve transactions
in which debt financing is secured by the target’s assets.329 Thus, the
enforceability of minority shareholder protections is a major concern for
private equity investors.330 Typically, private equity funds investing in
China have been set up as offshore funds to take advantage of
preferential tax treatment and to avoid oversight by Chinese
authorities.331 In a recent development, however, the Chinese
government has permitted foreign investors to establish foreign-invested
partnerships (“FIP”) that mainly engage in the investment business.332
Such FIPs will make it easier for private equity firms to set up onshore
funds that operate in China’s currency RMB (so-called “RMB funds”),
thus avoiding both the approval difficulties associated with offshore
investment structures and the risk of an appreciating RMB.333 The
number of RMB funds has grown substantially in recent years and in
2009, the number of deals done by RMB funds for the first time
exceeded those sponsored by foreign funds.334
1. Foreign Direct Investment
In 2009, China’s net inflows of FDI amounted to $147.8 billion, up
from $79.1 billion in 2005, making China only second in net FDI
inflows behind the U.S.335 As any other country, China encourages or
restricts FDI in certain industry sectors. Generally, FDI is deemed to be
allowed unless restricted or prohibited in the Catalogue for the Guidance
of Foreign Investment Industries.336 Moreover, the Catalogue contains
industries that are marked as “encouraged.”337 Currently, FDI is
encouraged in high technology and certain service industries, but

329. David Patrick Eich & Chuan Li, Private Equity Investments in China: Impact
of Recent Legal Reforms, 18 VENTURE CAP. REV. 9, 9 (2007).
330. See supra Part II.B.
331. Lutz-Christian Wolff, China’s Private International Investment Law: One-Way
Street into PRC Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 1039, 1068-69 (2008); see infra Part
II.D.3.a.
332. Epstein, supra note 325, at *13.
333. Id.
334. Man, supra note 326, at *3.
335. WORLD BANK, supra note 5.
336. Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at 204.
337. See, e.g., Eich & Li, supra note 329, at 9.
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prohibited in industries involving non-renewable natural resources, and
businesses that may affect national security, such as news websites and
internet providers.338 FDI is restricted in securities companies and
discouraged in solely export-oriented businesses.339
Foreign investors can only invest through FIEs.340 The most
common FIEs are equity joint ventures, wholly foreign owned
enterprises and foreign invested companies limited by shares. 341 If no
industry sector restrictions apply, a foreign investor is generally
permitted to purchase equity securities of a domestic enterprise or to
subscribe to newly issued shares of a domestic entity, but the price paid
must constitute at least 90% of the securities’ appraised value.342
Moreover, participation in Chinese enterprises below 25% is not
encouraged and may be excluded from certain preferential treatment of
foreign investment.343 Purchase or subscription agreements must be
governed by Chinese law, and the domestic enterprise must be
converted into a FIE, unless the target is already a FIE.344
2. Takeovers of Public Targets
The Chinese mainland capital markets are divided in an A-share
market and a B-share market.345 A-shares are denominated and traded in
RMB, and traded on both the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and the
Shanghai Stock Exchange.346 B-shares are denominated in U.S. dollars
on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, but denominated in Hong Kong
dollars on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.347 In addition, H-shares are
shares issued by Chinese joint stock companies, traded on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange, and denominated in Hong Kong dollars.348
Acquisition and trade of A-shares of a Chinese company listed on a
338.
339.
340.
341.

Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at 204.
Id.
Wolff, supra note 331, at 1041.
Wolff, supra note 331, at 1041-44; see also Feist et al., supra note 328, at 2;
Shen, supra note 33, at 198.
342. Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at 205.
343. Id.
344. Wolff, supra note 331, at 1061-62; see also Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at
205.
345. Man, supra note 326, at *2; see also STOWELL, supra note 17, at 140-41.
346. Man, supra note 326, at *2.
347. Id.
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Chinese stock exchange by foreign investors is limited. Certain foreign
financial institutions can purchase and hold no more than 10% of
outstanding A-shares of a listed company through the qualified foreign
institutional investor scheme.349 “Strategic investors” are permitted to
acquire a controlling stake in a Chinese listed company through a
private purchase of shares from existing shareholders or a private
placement of new shares by the listed company if they own offshore
assets of at least $100 million or manage offshore assets of at least $500
million.350 The share purchase must exceed 10% of the target’s
outstanding shares and must be submitted to the MOC for approval.351
Importantly, the investor must agree to hold the purchased shares for at
least three years.352
An investor who acquires shares of a listed company through a
stock exchange must report its holdings once it crosses the 5% threshold
and then upon every crossing of a multiple of 5%.353 An investor seeking
to take over a publicly listed company must make a general offer to all
target shareholders if it intends to acquire more than 30% of the target’s
outstanding shares.354 The acquirer must prepare a detailed prospectus
containing purchase price, shares to be acquired, sources of the
necessary funds and any special terms of the offer.355 Upon receipt of the
prospectus, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”) has
15 days to object to and stop the offer.356 To the benefit of the investor,
however, the target is prohibited from employing dilutive measures,
such as a poison pill, or other means to prevent the takeover.357
3. Corporate Law and Legal Enforcement
China’s new Company Law, which became effective on January 1,
2006, provided several changes that allowed for more flexibility in
349. TAO JINGSZHOU & OWEN NEE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA § 7:18;
Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at 206, n.3.
350. Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at 206.
351. TAO & NEE, supra note 349, § 7:20.
352. Id.
353. Id. § 7:35.
354. Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at 205-06.
355. TAO & NEE, supra note 349, § 7:36.
356. Id.
357. Bortnick & Forry, supra note 28, at 206.
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structuring foreign private equity investments.358 Subject to the consent
of all shareholders, the company’s profits may be distributed to
shareholders independent from their proportionate stake in the company,
suggesting that under the new Company Law, a private equity
investment could be structured with different classes of shares.359 Going
in the same direction, the corporate charter can provide that voting rights
are allocated without regard to the respective shareholding percentage.360
However, the law governing FIEs still requires that economic interests
in a FIE are distributed according to each shareholder’s pro rata interest
in the FIE, thus making it difficult for FIEs to adopt a multiple-class
share structure.361 Private equity investors can protect their investment
against dilution by adopting a charter provision that gives shareholders a
preemptive right to make further equity contributions in the event the
company proposed to issue fresh capital.362 Further, investors can be
granted tag-along and drag-along rights.363
The new Company Law also introduced new corporate governance
provisions, including express duties of care and loyalty imposed on a
company’s directors and senior management.364 Moreover, the
company’s information available to shareholders upon request has been
extended to articles of association, financial reports, accounting books
and board and shareholders’ meeting minutes.365
a. Enforceability of Contractual Rights
While the new Company Law introduced many provisions that
allow for a more flexible and thus more attractive private equity
investment structure, these changes are still relatively new to Chinese
law and the enforcement of vehicles such as tag-along and drag-along
rights has not yet been tested in Chinese courts.366 “Contracting-out” by
choosing the law of a different jurisdiction to govern the investment is
not available to the investor as Chinese law is mandatory in regard to the
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Eich & Li, supra note 329, at 35.
Id.; Shen, supra note 33, at 200-01.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 201-02.
Eich & Li, supra note 329, at 35.
Shen, supra note 33, at 202-03.
Id. at 202.
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transfer of equity interests in Chinese companies.367 In order to avoid
Chinese regulatory oversight and to choose a more certain governing
law and venue, private equity investors have commonly employed an
offshore investment structure dubbed “outbound-inbound,” “roundtripping” or “red-chip” investment.368 Under such a structure, the
Chinese target’s shareholders invest alongside with the private equity
fund in an offshore vehicle which then acquires the target as a wholly
foreign owned enterprise.369 Thus, on the offshore level all the
investment protections and structures commonly found in private equity
deals can be implemented, including investment by the private equity
fund through convertible preferred shares.370 However, in order to
prevent significant loss in tax revenue, the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange (“SAFE”) moved to curb round-tripping in 2005 by
requiring Chinese residents to register and obtain approval from SAFE
when intending to invest in an offshore vehicle.371 In addition, the
domestic entity must disclose the intended shareholding structure to
MOC and obtain approval to invest in an offshore special purpose
vehicle (“SPV”) under the Provisions on Acquisitions of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (the “2006 M&A Rules”).372 The MOC
has not yet approved any such transaction since the 2006 M&A Rules
became effective.373 Consequently, private equity firms must now
consider to “go onshore” by investing directly into Chinese target
companies.374 So far, many private equity firms still benefit from the fact
that investments made prior to the 2006 M&A Rules becoming
effective, as well as subsequent restructurings of such investments, are
not subject to the new regulation.375 Thus, it still remains to be seen to
what extent private equity firms will be willing to invest onshore in the

367.
368.

1069.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at 209.
See id. at 211; Feist et al., supra note 328, at 1-2; Wolff, supra note 331, at
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future. In this context, shareholders’ agreements will likely become
more common to protect the investment.376
b. Reliability of the Legal System
China does not have a well-developed reporting system for judicial
decisions, and judicial decisions do not have precedential effect
comparable to that in common law systems.377 This creates uncertainty
regarding the availability and enforceability of some of the typical
investor protection devices found in private equity deals, such as
preferred stock and redemption rights.378 In the context of government
approvals, it is crucial to communicate with the responsible authorities
at an early stage to assess how the statutory law will be implemented.379
Most agreements on foreign-related transactions include an
arbitration clause.380 Chinese law provides for the enforcement of
arbitration clauses and arbitral awards are typically enforced by Chinese
courts without a review on the merits.381 The Chinese government has
established the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commission (“CIETAC”) in Beijing which has a reputation for being
fair and relatively experienced in transactional matters.382 If the investor
prefers a neutral location for the arbitration, Hong Kong is a frequent
choice for its close proximity to China and yet Western approach to
business transactions.383

376.
377.

TAO & NEE, supra note 349, § 7:22.
Henry Wang, Developing Savvy M&A Strategies in China, in BEST PRACTICES
FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN CHINA, LEADING LAWYERS ON
STRUCTURING AND NEGOTIATING TRADE TRANSACTIONS, UNDERSTANDING THE
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INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS COMMUNITY (2009), available at 2009 WL 1007716 *54.
378. Feist et al., supra note 328, at 2.
379. Wang, supra note 377, at 56; see also Jeanette K. Chan, Tackling New
Regulatory Challenges for M&A in China, in BEST PRACTICES FOR MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS IN CHINA: LEADING LAWYERS ON CLOSING A SUCCESSFUL TRANSACTION,
NAVIGATING THE NEW ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW, AND UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF
THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC DOWNTURN (2010), available at 2010 WL 1976200, at *3.
380. Wang, supra note 377, at 60; see also Shen, supra note 33, at 209.
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4. Exiting from the Chinese Investment
With 259 deals for a total of $66 billion, Greater China led the
world in both number of deals and total funds raised in 2007.384 The
Chinese domestic capital markets saw high volatility during the
financial crisis, with the Shanghai Stock Exchange dropping from a
record high of 6,124.04 points in October 2007 to 1,664.93 points in
October 2008.385 This led to the CSRC suspending IPOs in September
2008.386 Post-crisis, however, an IPO on a domestic exchange is the
most popular exit strategy for private equity firms.387 IPO volume on the
Shanghai and Shenzen Stock Exchanges combined reached $72.1 billion
in 2010, for the first time topping the volume of listings in Hong Kong
and New York.388 This development is mainly due to two factors. First,
the regulations restricting round-trip investments have effectively
excluded a large number of Chinese companies from listing on a foreign
exchange, such as in Hong Kong or New York.389 Second, the CSRC in
2009 launched the Growth Enterprise Market (“GEM”) on the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange, allowing Chinese companies with a relatively low
profit of RMB 5,000,000390 to list, provided that the revenue growth rate
was at least 30% in the prior two years.391 The GEM provides an
attractive alternative to a listing on one of China’s larger market
segments, and especially compared to a costly listing abroad.392 As of
April 2010, about 75% of IPOs on GEM were private equity-backed.393
Additionally, mainland Chinese companies historically trade at a
premium compared to mainland Chinese companies listed in Hong
Kong, mainly because the restrictions on mainland Chinese residents to
invest abroad create a “shortage in supply” on mainland exchanges.394
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
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389. Man, supra note 326 at *4; see supra Part II.D.3.a.
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Prior to the 2006 regulations restricting round-tripping structures,
exits through listings on international exchanges were preferred by
private equity investors.395 Since more and more investors now have to
invest directly into domestic Chinese entities,396 listings abroad have
become less popular and the investors can often obtain higher valuations
for their portfolio companies on domestic exchanges.397 However,
should the investor wish to exit through an offshore listing, it is possible
for the investor to “swap” the interests in the Chinese company for
shares of an offshore entity and subsequently list the now offshore entity
on an exchange abroad.398 The domestic company and the offshore
entity must obtain approval from the MOC and conduct the offshore
IPO within one year from the approval date.399
Additionally, more private equity investors now consider a private
sale or a stock repurchase by the portfolio company as a major exit
strategy.400 In considering a private sale, the investor has to keep in mind
that every M&A transaction in China, independent of its size and
industry, requires government approval.401 Especially large deals that
require approval by the central government can be very time
consuming.402
CONCLUSION
“One group comprises those that have displayed remarkable
resilience during the global financial crisis. This group of ‘winners’
includes Brazil, China, India . . . .”403 “Russia has experienced a very
difficult crisis, which raises concerns about its long-term growth trend,”
but “Russia had performed better than our expectations until the crisis,
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and, if it recovers strongly and quickly in 2010 and 2011, as we expect,
we believe it will deserve its BRIC status.”404 Is this assessment of the
larger economic development of the BRICs by Goldman Sachs’s Jim
O’Neill also valid for the private equity sector? How has the legal and
political framework in the BRICs developed to foster foreign private
equity investment that can contribute to economic growth?
All four countries have significantly improved their corporate law.
While many changes are still in their infancy and have not yet been
thoroughly tested, the level of sophistication is in most cases
comparable to that of developed countries. Thus, with a few exceptions,
private equity investors generally find all the necessary tools, from
convertible preferred stock schemes to covenants and anti-dilution
protection, to structure a successful private equity investment. The need
for improvement remains in regard to the uncertainties surrounding the
enforceability of shareholders’ agreements in Russia and the availability
of convertible preferred shares in China. Differences in the corporate
governance level appear not so much in the black letter law, but rather in
the actual ownership structures of the local businesses. In Brazil, as well
as in Russia, concentrated ownership and family-dominated
management can create agency costs and disputes between management
and investor. However, while in Brazil this is a problem mainly
associated with older, more mature companies, investors still name
untrustworthy partners as the main reason to abandon deals in Russia,
where many insiders benefited from large scale government
privatizations. In India, it can be difficult to negotiate deals when
companies are owned and run by large families and each family
member’s approval must be sought.
Governments cannot directly regulate the factual ownership
structures of their businesses. Thus, one could argue that this is an area
beyond governmental reach. However, improving corporate governance
structures is an important lever that private equity firms employ when
seeking to increase the target’s value for a later exit, preferably through
a public listing. Thus, by opening markets to the private sector and by
further encouraging private equity investment, governments can invite
the players they need to break up concentrated ownership structures and
make management accountable. While all BRICs, just as any developed
nations, restrict FDI in certain strategic sectors, government interference
404.
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appears to be particularly significant in Russia and China. In Russia, it is
the vast amount of restricted sectors (42) that still limit foreign private
equity investment in many areas. It remains to be seen whether the
Russian government follows through with its promise to ease limitations
in some of the industry sectors. In China, interference is manifested
through the many obligatory government approvals, not only for FDI
but also any domestic M&A transactions. Importantly, it seems that it is
at least relatively predictable under what circumstances government
approvals will be granted. In India, the relatively strict FDI regime is
substantially mitigated for private equity investors by the possibility to
register as a FVCI.
The analysis of the corporate laws and securities regulation in the
BRICs shows that the legal framework is relatively developed in all four
countries. Difficulties, however, arise in the implementation of legal
rules. Judicial systems in the BRICs are slow and often still
inexperienced or overwhelmed by a heavy case load. This can lead to
major delays and/or hasty, ill-informed judicial decisions when judges
attempt to reduce their docket quickly. Therefore, resorting to arbitration
is a must and a viable alternative as all four BRICs are signatories to the
1958 New York Convention. A more difficult challenge to sidestep is
corruption, which is still a major concern especially in Russia. Despite
the Russian government’s efforts to curb corruption, Russia still ranks
only 143rd out of 182 nations on the Transparency International
Corruption Perception Index. Corruption is a significant deterrent in
particular for U.S. investors, given the liabilities U.S. entities face under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
A common technique for private equity investors to evade weak
legal systems is the so-called round-tripping or red-chip structure. Aside
from advantageous tax treatment, this enables investors to structure their
investment under a favorable and reliable legal system which allows for
the legal instruments and investor protections commonly employed in
private equity deals. The consequences of this form of regulatory
arbitrage for the host countries are a loss of both tax revenue and
regulatory grasp of foreign investment. Among the BRICs, roundtripping is still the prevalent structure in Russia and was in China until
the 2006 M&A Rules introduced severe limitations. Many investments
into China were made prior to the new regulation becoming effective
and thus are not subject to the approval requirements. It still has to be
seen whether foreign private equity investors will, to the same extent, be
willing to invest through onshore structures in the future. However, it
seems that instead of imposing restrictions on round-tripping, it would
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be preferable to implement reforms domestically that render such
arbitrage unnecessary.
Finally, the availability of an IPO exit, preferably on a domestic
exchange, is the driving force for the growth of private equity in the
emerging markets. The difficulties Russian companies face when
seeking to access domestic or international capital markets appear to
explain to a substantial degree why Russia is trailing behind the other
three BRIC countries. Brazil took decisive steps to make its domestic
capital markets more attractive and to entice liquidity, in particular
through the introduction of Novo Mercado. China had large success
with the establishment of the Growth Enterprise Market on the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange, which compensates for the fact that offshore
listings have become difficult under the more restrictive regulation. In
India, while the domestic markets are still lacking liquidity, companies
have relatively easy access to capital on LSE’s Alternative Investment
Market. In Russia, however, an IPO is often neither available
domestically nor on an international exchange. While both the number
and volume of domestic IPOs have increased in recent years, these
numbers were mainly driven by large, often formerly state-owned
companies. For the majority, the Russian capital markets still do not
offer the necessary liquidity. Therefore, Russian companies routinely
seek to list abroad, predominantly on the LSE. However, Russian
securities regulation severely limits the amount of shares that can be
listed abroad through an ADR/GDR program in order to induce issuers
to list at home. Again, strengthening the domestic markets by reforming
applicable regulation and further enhancing access for foreign
investment seems to be a preferable response over imposing restrictions
on listings abroad.
The analysis of the environment for private equity in the four
BRICs indicates that Brazil offers the most attractive legal, economic
and political environment for private equity investments. Yet, China
leads the market for foreign private equity, partly by sheer size and
growth opportunity, but also because it offers, despite its restrictions for
foreign investors, a reliable legal system and viable opportunities for an
exit by way of an IPO. Once China reduces the amount of government
involvement, it will become an even more attractive market for private
equity. India offers growth opportunities similar to those in China, but
will have to improve the liquidity of its domestic capital markets, as
well as the regulatory transparency. It appears that Russia has the most
room for improvement. First, Russia will need to have more success in
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fighting corruption. Second, it will need to offer private equity investors
better exit strategies. In the short term, this would be possible by easing
restrictions for listings on international exchanges. In the long term,
Russia must increase the attractiveness of its domestic capital markets.
Brazil’s high corporate governance Novo Mercado and China’s middle
market GEM serve as model examples.

